The story of Bt Cotton in Andhra Pradesh - Part 2

Here's the second part of the new report: "The story of Bt Cotton in Andhra Pradesh: Erratic Processes and Results", just published by the Centre for Sustainable Agriculture, Secunderabad

CONTENT
[following on from part 1]
-Year II: 2003-04
-Year III: 2004-05
-SUMMING UP THE THREE YEARS
-References
-Annex
------

The Story of Bt Cotton in India and in Andhra Pradesh [PART 2]

Year II: 2003-04

Given the widespread reports of Bt Cotton failure in various parts of the country in its first year of commercial cultivation (2002-03), the second year began on an aggressive push for Bt Cotton by the companies involved. They would not admit to failure, nor were they willing to pay compensation to farmers who have incurred losses. Confronted by Greenpeace India activists who stormed the Monsanto office in Bangalore exactly one year after approval for commercial cultivation, Monsanto began backtracking on its promises and said in its interview to NDTV, "we had never promised higher yields". This is a clear lie since all their propaganda material promises higher yields to farmers.

In a desperate bid to save face and their markets, the company intensified its aggressive marketing and changed its strategies.

Free Pesticides and Propaganda: New schemes were introduced for farmers, including free gifts of pesticides along with Bt Cotton seeds and more efforts put into PR, especially with the media. A Tata Mida container was given free of cost with the purchase of Bt Cotton seed as one of the marketing strategies. There was a blitzkrieg of advertisements showing farmers claiming to have gotten very good results from growing Bt Cotton. Activists asked some basic questions about these advertisements: why is it that advertisements being put out in Warangal district, for instance, had farmers vouching for better performance from districts like Guntur and Karimnagar? How are farmers in Warangal supposed to check the veracity of such advertisements and their claims? Also, is it by intention that these advertisements were sometimes made to look like media reports?

A controversial and thoroughly discredited scientific paper was published in a reputed journal around this time (by Qaim and Zilberman, which reported an 87% increase in yield with Monsanto's Bt Cotton, using data supplied by Monsanto without collecting or analyzing any other data), with questionable data from the field trials projecting great results with Bt Cotton even as data from the farmers indicated the burden that Bt Cotton cultivation had placed on farmers who were already in distress. Many activists sprung into action to show the scientific paper for what it really was, given its timing and its questionable credibility.

Replacement of non-performing varieties: Instead of MECH 162 Bt in states like Andhra Pradesh, MECH 12 Bt was increased. A variety that is supposed to be more high yielding and with longer staple than MECH 162 Bt was promoted during this year.

Sub-licensing the technology: This year also saw Monsanto sub-license its Bollgard gene to other hybrid-cotton producing companies like Raasi, Ankur, Ajeet, Nuziveedu, Sri Tulasi etc. The sub-licensing to companies other than Mahyco is a desperate search for more acceptable varieties by Monsanto. In June 2003, Raasi Seeds was disallowed its application for commercial release of RCH2 Bt, but allowed seed production and large scale field trials of this variety on 100,000 hectares in the southern and central zones. Using the opportunity, during the 2003-04 season, Raasi Seeds readied seed that could cover 360,000 acres. GE advocates also predicted that the competition would bring down the price of Bt Cotton seed, conveniently forgetting the fact that the Indian companies which have been sub-licensed the Bt technology by Monsanto were ending up paying crores of rupees as the licence fees and would therefore like to recover the same from farmers.

In the second season of commercial cultivation of Bt Cotton in Andhra Pradesh (2003-04), 12,148 Bt Cotton seed packets were sold (Mahyco 6207 and Monsanto 5941) to cover an area of 4859 hectares. The coverage of Bt Cotton against the total actual cotton sown area of 7,85,230 hectares was 0.62% during Kharif 2003. Compared to the 9341 Bt Cotton seed packets sold in 2002-03, this meant an increase of about 30%. The increase in Bt Cotton area is nearly proportional to the increase in the total area under cotton cultivation in the state.

The district wise distribution of Bt Cotton in Kharif 2003 was:
District No. of packets sold Total
Monsanto India Ltd MECH 12 Bt Mahyco Seeds MECH 12 Bt Mahyco Seeds MECH 162 Bt
Srikakulam 0 0 0 0
Vizianagaram 0 17 0 17
Visakhapatnam 0 0 0 0
East Godavari 160 37 0 197
West Godavari 0 42 0 42
Krishna 330 265 30 625
Guntur 1179 1205 26 2410
Prakasam 0 134 0 134
Nellore 0 0 0 0
Kurnool 229 0 0 229
Anantapur 0 0 0 0
Kadapa 0 9 0 9
Chittoor 0 0 0 0
Rangareddy 82 663 0 745
Nizamabad 0 0 0 0
Medak 228 350 0 578
Mahbubnagar 160 155 0 315
Nalgonda 424 549 9 982
Warangal 1479 900 118 2497
Khammam 1306 843 70 2219
Karimnagar 103 396 0 499
Adilabad 261 235 2 498
5941 5812 395 12148

One of the strategies seemed to be to focus on particular districts like Warangal, Khammam and Guntur and reduce the area in districts like Mahbubnagar and Karimnagar from where some of the most disastrous results emerged during the previous season.

It has to be observed here that independent assessments of Bt Cotton performance in the second year were few. Even the media did not pay much attention to Bt Cotton in the second year. This was probably because of a few reasons:

* in all those cases where Bt Cotton fared poorly in the first year of commercial cultivation, it was probably expected to die a natural death; this assumption however did not take into account the aggressive propaganda to be launched by the company

* there was also a sense of disillusionment with the AP government which did not show any will to fix any liability on the company for the large scale failure

* at the Central level also, things began to be run in a more opaque manner than ever. Data or decision-making processes were not transparent to be influenced. The first year reports submitted by various independent agencies were simply ignored and disregarded.

However, Monsanto-Mahyco chose one more strategy to promote its products. This time, instead of using a Mahyco-conducted survey to talk about the performance of Bt Cotton, A C Nielson was commissioned to do a survey. A C Nielson came up with a (predictably) positive report. However, a season-long monitoring done by independent competent agencies like Deccan Development Society, Permaculture Association of India and AP Coalition in Defence of Diversity of Andhra Pradesh has other things to point out about the second year’s performance too.

"Did Bt Fail AP Again in 2003-2004?", as this report was called, also challenges the AC Nielson study commissioned by MMB, for its design and methodology in addition to the veracity of findings. This report disproves Bt Cotton failed on all its three main promises pesticide use reduction, subsequent reduction in cultivation costs and enhancement of farmers’ profits.

The study found that:

* farmers had to incur an expenditure that was 230% more for Bt Cotton seeds than Non-Bt hybrids

* total investments for Bt were 8% higher than for the cultivation of non-Bt cotton with a difference of Rs. 903/- per acre

* reduction in pesticide consumption by Bt farmers was negligible at just 12% at Rs. 321/- - the net difference across the three farming categories assessed in the study clearly shows that the net difference between Bt and non-Bt crops when it comes to bollworm management between Bt and non-Bt crops was less than Rs. 500/- which is the cost of just one additional spray

* Bt crop required more number of sprays for controlling sucking pests than non-Bt

* net profits from Bt Cotton were 9% less compared to profits from non-bt hybrids

* the benefit-cost ratio was in favour of non-Bt hybrids

* for small and medium category farmers, the yield difference between Bt and non-Bt was negligible

A comparison of the findings from AC Nielson’s study (commissioned by Monsanto) and APCIDD’s study is very interesting for the contrasting pictures they present.

State Bollworm Reduction Pesticide Usage Yield Increase Increase in Net Profit
% Rs % Quintals/Acre % Rs/Acre
Andhra Pradesh : Monsanto Study 58% 1856/- 24% 1.98 92 5138/-
Andhra Pradesh: APCIDD Study 14% 321/- 2% 0.09 (-) 9% (-) 750/-

As is apparent, the industry has claimed four times more than the actual reduction in pesticide use, 12 times more yield and 100 times more profit than the actual.

As per the AC Nielson's study, the average number of pesticide sprays on Bollgard Bt Cotton was 3.6 times in 2003-04, while on Non-Bt it was 5.2 times. A report by the State Level Committee in Andhra Pradesh during a visit on 11-11-2003 in Medak and Rangareddy districts clearly shows a different thing. Five farmers met by the Committee on that day reported an average number of 5.2 sprays on MECH 12 Bt.

Meanwhile, Gene Campaign also surveyed 136 farm families in the four districts of Warangal, Guntur, Mahbubnagar and Rangareddy for the 2003-04 cotton cultivation. The study found that like in the first year, the economics of cultivating the Monsanto variety remains adverse to the farmer. The study also found that AP was swamped with a large number of illegal variants of Bt Cotton. There is chaos in the cotton fields and nobody can say with any guarantee what has been cultivated and how much, says Suman Sahai. According to Gene Campaign, almost no one had planted Monsanto’s failed MECH 162 from the earlier year. The few that did, reported the same poor results. An interesting finding from the study was that farmers who had planted Monsanto’s MECH 162 last year got poor chilli crops in the same fields the next year. Other Chilli fields which were not earlier planted with Bt Cotton were not affected and this needs further investigation, the report points. Suman Sahai, speculating on
three possibilities for illegal varieties by the names of Rasi Bt, Bunny Bt, Ankur Bt etc., proliferating ("one, it could be leaking of Rasi, Ankur Bt varieties before completion of official approval; two, it could be a cover up for the illegal Navbharat varieties; or three, fly by night operators are marketing spurious Bt cotton seeds which may not even contain the Bt gene") says that most local cottons carrying the Bt gene are outperforming the Monsanto varieties.

Given that there is widespread cultivation of illegal Bt Cotton in the state, Suman Sahai questions Nielson's data. "What have they actually surveyed and what do their results mean? It would be difficult to take at face value the data that A C Nielson has put out and their ringing endorsement of Monsanto's Bollgard
we are in a rather curious situation where the only people praising the Monsanto varieties are Monsanto themselves. Every other agency is reporting results to the contrary, that Monsanto varieties are the worst performers when compared to good local hybrids and illegal Bt variants", she says.

As can be seen, 2003-04 once again brought home the utter failure of the regulatory mechanisms in this country.

Year III: 2004-05

On 6th April 2004, conditional approval was granted by the GEAC for commercial release of RCH2 Bt of Rasi Seeds for South (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu) and Central Zone (Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh) from Kharif 2004 upto March 2007. The approval was granted after only two years of large scale field trials. The conditions were similar to those imposed while approving the three MECH Bt varieties for commercial cultivation earlier in March 2002. Approval was also granted for large scale field trials in Kharif 2004 for other Raasi varieties like RCH 20 Bt (in the southern zone), RCH 138 Bt and RCH 144 Bt (in the central zone). The total area for the large scale field trials in farmers’ fields was not to exceed 150 hectares, at the rate of 50 hectares for each hybrid in the respective zones.

The table below shows the state-wise breakup of Bt Cotton seed sales (packets sold, with one packet equivalent to one acre of land) in 2003-04 and 2004-05:
State Kharif 2003 Kharif 2004
Andhra Pradesh 13500 190000
Gujarat 103000 320000
Karnataka 7500 45000
Madhya Pradesh 33000 207000
Maharashtra 54000 525000
Tamil Nadu 19000 13000
Total 230000 1300000
Source: Monsanto India, quoted in Financial Express, 29/11/04

The total acreage of Bt Cotton increased by around 6 times from the previous year. This included four varieties including a very popular local hybrid from Raasi (which is a popular variety in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka). The Bt Cotton area is still a negligible part 5.7% - of the total cotton acreage of 22.5 million (or 225 lakh) acres in the country. These seed sales are alone worth Rs 208 crores of rupees for the companies involved.

The following is the extent of Bt Cotton seed sales in Andhra Pradesh during Kharif 2004:
District Mahyco Seeds Ltd Rasi Seeds Ltd Total
Mech 12 Bt Mech 162 Bt Mech 184 Bt RCH 2 Bt
Vizianagaram 230 0 0 30 260
East Godavari 230 0 0 80 310
West Godavari 50 0 0 0 50
Krishna 2340 0 0 3310 5650
Guntur 8163 0 10 14500 22673
Prakasam 370 30 0 100 500
Kurnool 1580 240 0 350 2170
Cuddapah 0 0 0 0 0
Rangareddy 8625 25 0 2525 11175
Nizamabad 125 0 200 100 425
Medak 4770 0 0 1290 6060
Mahbubnagar 7330 0 0 8220 15550
Nalgonda 5911 0 0 70 5981
Warangal 15100 550 4300 26110 46060
Khammam 9170 170 40 8510 17890
Karimnagar 14960 0 20 6720 21700
Adilabad 14400 0 1850 9170 25420
Others 20 0 0 290 310
TOTAL 93374 1015 6420 81375 182184

The projected sales in Andhra Pradesh before the beginning of the season was put at 228,000 seed packets whereas the actual sales were to the tune of around 182000 packets. This covers an area of nearly 72,874 hectares. From 4859 hectares in 2003-04, this shows an increase of around 14 times. Out of this, RCH2 Bt alone contributes to a 6-fold increase.

In April 2004, GEAC approved large scale field trials and seed production of 12 more Bt hybrid varieties Rasi seeds was allowed to conduct trials with RCH 368 in South India and RCH 316 in North India. Ankur Seeds was allowed to go ahead with Ankur 651 Bt and Ankur 2534 Bt in North India, and Ankur 651 Bt and Ankur 09 Bt in Central India. Nuziveedu’s NCS 145 Bt and NCS 207 Bt for Central and South zones were also allowed. Mahyco has been allowed field trials and seed production with MRC 6301 Bt and MRC 6160 Bt in central India, MRC 6301 Bt and MRC 6322 Bt in South India. The seed production for each variety was allowed on a maximum extent of 100 hectares.

Early in the season in 2004, there were some unfounded statements made by the Andhra Pradesh Minister for Agriculture and Commissioner & Director for Agriculture on the excellent performance of Bt Cotton in the state.

Also as early as November 5 2004, the Minister for Agriculture, Mr Sharad Pawar made a surprising media statement saying that the "Bt cotton yield was definitely better in quality and quantity, boosting production by 30 to 35 percent in areas it was sown". He also noted that relatively low infestation levels of cotton's principal pest, the bollworm, and favorable monsoon rains helped produce the bumper cotton crop. This statement is surprising given that there was no data with the officials about the share of Bt Cotton in the total production of cotton the harvesting season had just begun for many cotton growing states, in fact.

Meanwhile, in the month of October 2004 itself, the Minister for Agriculture in Andhra Pradesh Mr Raghuveera Reddy had to announce that there is prima-facie evidence to indicate the failure of MECH 184 Bt in Warangal district. He informed that farmers have sown this seed on an extent of around 25000 acres.

A six member expert team from the government, which examined the standing crop of nine farmers in Atmakur and Chennaraopet mandals of the district, found only 15 to 20 cotton bolls in the first stage and no cotton boll in the second stage of Mech-184 Bt cotton. On the basis of this report, 50 teams had been formed which would visit the field of every farmer who had sown Bt cottonseed in the district and submit report within a week, the Minister announced. The Minister also announced that compensation to farmers would be given on the basis of these reports within the 15 days stipulated by the MoU the State Government had entered into with the seed companies.

The Minister was forced to make a second statement in the State Legislative Assembly in the middle of December on the performance of Bt Cotton. According to him Bt Cotton seed was resistant to bollworm but it has not been found free from other diseases. He once again announced that compensation could be claimed through the MoU system. There is a background to the Minister’s statements on both these occasions where he clearly backtracked from an optimistic statement he put out early on in the season.

Bt Cotton Farmers begin agitating in different districts:Just days after the Commissioner, Agriculture in the Government of Andhra Pradesh made positive remarks about Bt Cotton in the state (October 4, 2004, The Hindu Business Line "Bt Cotton crop likely to create problem of plenty in AP"), farmers went on a rampage in Warangal district fearing that they might have been sold spurious seeds by the local traders. What has triggered the panic is the failure of Bt Cotton in yet another season


It is estimated that out of 160 thousand hectares sown in Warangal district with cotton, around 25 thousand hectares are under Bt Cotton (the sales of 450 gm packets of Bt Cotton touched the 25000 mark this year, as per media reports). Starting from 12th October, farmers started their protests across the district of Warangal where they raided shops and imprisoned seed company employees and are demanding compensation ranging from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- per acre for the losses incurred.

On 12th October hundreds of farmers turned up on the streets of Warangal town where the seed and pesticide dealer shops are located. They were demanding at least ten thousand rupees per acre as compensation for the losses they incurred by growing Mech Bt 12 and Mech Bt 184 varieties. They raided Vasavi Fertilisers and Seeds shop, from which they had bought the expensive Bt Cotton seeds. The dealer tried to assure them that he would get the company officials to come to the villages and assess the damage, and get them to pay compensation if needed. The farmers were not ready to accept this. They staged a sit-in on the highway holding up a long chain of traffic. The farmers wanted the officials to visit their village and see the damage for themselves. A group of officials and the seeds dealer went to the village along with the farmers and checked the cotton crop there. Later, the Deputy Director of Agriculture, Warangal district assured the farmers that there would be an inquiry and
after submitting the report to the government, any compensation to be paid would be arranged.

An assurance from the district officials that a wider field investigation would be taken up calmed the farmers. Following this, on Wednesday, agriculture department officials and Mahyco Company Area Manager and other officials went to Mogilicherla village where more than 500 acres of Bt Cotton had been sown. Here, the farmers like farmers in other parts of Warangal had spent Rs. 1650/- on procuring seeds (450 gms of Bollguard Bt Cotton Mech Bt 12) and had sown the seed. They found that the crop grew well but did not flower well or yield more than ten bolls. Representatives of Mahyco company who had come to the village to inspect the fields by themselves were imprisoned by the farmers for more than three hours in the village, demanding immediate payment of compensation. The employees were freed when they assured the farmers that they would bring senior officials of the company to the village on the 14th.

On the 14th of October, hundreds of more farmers once again raided seed shops in Warangal town demanding compensation and accountability from the company, the dealers and the government. They came with Bt Cotton plants which did not yield either flowers or bolls on their fields. Farmers from various blocks like Atmakur, Sangem, Jafargad, Parvathagiri, Parakala, Geesukonda, Hanmakonda, Dharmasagar, Mogullapalli etc., soon joined the agitating farmers in huge numbers. They attacked the shop of Vasavi Seeds and Fertilisers, the supplier of Bollguard seeds to them. By this time, all the seed, pesticide and fertilizer dealers in Warangal town had closed their shutters down and ran away from the scene, fearing the wrath of the farmers. A Committee was formed with one representative each from each village, along with some local officials (who came to placate the farmers) to look into the matter by visiting the fields. After this, the farmers withdrew their protest for the day. The District
Collector had meanwhile sent word to the company representatives to hear their explanation. The Collector is making preparations to send teams consisting of the company representatives, officials and the farmer representatives to all the villages from where reports of losses were obtained, as per media reports. Meanwhile all Bt Cotton farmers who have incurred losses due to the failure of crop have been asked to register their name and other details with the concerned agriculture department officials.

Around this time, there was news of a suicide committed by a Bt Cotton farmer in Warangal district who killed himself unable to bear the heavy losses incurred.

This was only the beginning of the season. Soon, agitations from other districts started. Farmers in Sathenapalli of Guntur district imprisoned a company representative and demanded compensation for the losses that they incurred. Karimnagar, Nalgonda, Krishna and Khammam had similar scenes with irate farmers agitating for compensation.

Meanwhile the vernacular media, especially the district editions of newspapers and telugu television channels started covering the problems of Bt Cotton farmers in a widespread manner. There were regular news reports as well as special feature programmes run by them and hundreds of farmers were heard to report their losses and their dismal crop performance witnessed.

All of this built tremendous pressure on the government to take some action and protect the interests of farmers who have incurred losses. However, the MoU system that the government of Andhra Pradesh had adopted began to come in the way of farmers securing justice. Like in the first year of Bt Cotton commercial cultivation, one of the arguments heard this year too was that losses incurred do not fit into the MoU framework which only talks about germination failure and lack of genetic purity.

Government survey’s findings:

No information is forthcoming from the government on the performance of Bt Cotton in the state though 50 teams are supposed to have visited the field and compiled a report on the same. The admission by the Minister about Bt Cotton being susceptible to diseases and other pests tacitly seems to say that Bt Cotton was found to be effective against bollworm (which is questionable as other reports point out). He also acknowledged that the reason for the rapid spread of Bt Cotton was false propaganda about the ability of the seed to withstand all pests and diseases.

Joint Directors of Agriculture who have been approached for information of the survey results in their own districts have also refused to part with the reports. Once again, the question of transparent procedures and processes comes to the fore. It is as though the government wants to protect the companies and their products from independent scrutiny.

In November, the agriculture officials in Warangal admitted that out of 20,000 hectares of Bt Cotton grown in the district, 65% of the crop was damaged. According to the Joint Director of Agriculture, Monsanto-Mahyco's seed created losses in all the places surveyed whereas Raasi Bt was found to be damaged upto 15%. The reason was wilt where the flower, bolls and the plants dried up resulting in very low yields.

The MoU system fails to protect farmers:

The stand of the government that the MoU system will take care of such Bt farmers who have incurred enormous losses does not lend hope to the already-distressed cotton farmers in the state.

This is due to several reasons:

* Firstly, there has been no large scale campaign taken up so far to educate farmers about their rights either through the MoU system or through the Consumer Courts and what they are required to do under these systems to secure justice. The MoU system comes with its own set of problems including the fact that farmers are expected to report in a time-bound manner and that the companies usually go in Appeal against the JDA committee’s awards in cases where awards have been passed in favour of farmers. This is reflected in the current Bt Cotton cases also. At the Appellate level, farmers have very little chance to defend themselves directly.

* Secondly, the MoUs cover only two aspects related to seed performance: germination failure and genetic impurity.

* With regard to germination, when it comes to crops like Bt Cotton with around 20% dedicated to non-Bt varieties for refugia, the germination that a seed producer/supplier could be allowed to show can be as low as 53%, given that cotton crop itself is allowed around 67% germination rates.

* When it comes to genetic impurity, the MoU that the government has signed along with several seed companies does not specify anywhere what constitutes genetic impurity. Genetic impurity is defined against morphological and genetic parameters obtained during registration. However, as Bt Cotton farmers are witnessing across this state, the rate of flower fall or wilt or other problems is much higher in this crop than other cotton hybrids. Studies elsewhere have also shown that while Bt Cotton might initially take care of bollworm infestation, other pests and diseases which are hitherto secondary, take on the role of primary pests and diseases. This is being seen in Andhra Pradesh. Genetic Impurity does not however cover these aspects.

* The farmers who incur losses in Bt Cotton inevitably lose out more than ordinary cotton farmers given the expensive rates at which the seed is being sold. Therefore, their distress levels now are that much more acute.

The MoU Committees investigating the crop performance in the field are reporting that things are fine as far as the MoU framework goes [since they do not see germination failure or genetic impurity] even as Agriculture Officers who have verified fields have testified that there has been large scale flower and boll drop, which would imply losses to the farmers.

Meanwhile, the company has announced in the month of October itself that it is not responsible for the failure of the crop since there has been a general failure of all varieties and hybrids of cotton. This is however not true as is reflected in the large scale excessive production of cotton this season, as well as from fact finding visits to Bt Cotton and other hybrid cotton fields in Warangal and Kurnool. These fact finding teams have found that other hybrids are not affected in neighboring fields.

Fact-finding visits in 2004:

By Centre for Sustainable Agriculture and AP Rythu Sangam:

Scientists from Centre from Sustainable Agriculture, Dr. Ramanjaneyulu and Mr. Ali, along with Mr. Sarampalli Malla Reddy, Secretary AP Rythu Sangam, Dr. Venugopal, Entomology Department, Acharya NG Ranga Agricultural University, Dr. Abdul Qayum, Consultant with MARI and DDS, Mr. Kiran Sakkari, Permaculture Association of India and Mr. Krishna Reddy, AP Rythu Sangam Warangal unit, visited villages in Geesukonda Mandal of Warangal district. The following are the findings.

In Rattiram Tanda, a small hamlet of Kommala village, various Bt cotton hybrids are being grown in more than 100 acres. The villagers purchased the Bt cotton hybrids from Warangal market hoping to tackle the dreaded Bollworm. But shattering their hopes the Bt hybrids failed. Mr. Veeraswamy, has grown Bt MECH-12. The plants are small, with only few bolls. Insects are eating away the bolls, despite the so-called new technology. More than 30% of the plants in the field have dried up. When split open, wilt symptoms are clearly seen. The story is repeated with Ms. Vankloth Vijaya who grew Bt RCH-2 of Raasi seeds, or Vankloth Balaraju who grew Bt MECH-184. Till now farmers have spent around 8 thousand rupees on pesticides like Avaunt and Tracer besides Rs. 1600 on seeds. When the suffering farmers contacted the dealers, they were told that the dealers were not responsible and were asked to meet the scientists of the Agricultural Research Station, Warangal. The company team never
visited and advised the farmers.

In Elukurthi Haveli, Mr. Yadava Reddy has grown Bt RCH-2. The crop has not performed as expected. The plants suffered wilt. The bolls are infested with bollworms.

In Konayamakula Mr. Narasinga Rao has grown Bt MECH-12 and has a similar experience to narrate.

The wilt symptoms in Bt cotton started appearing in the initial year itself. The company and the government had turned a deaf ear to the apprehensions raised by several investigating teams closely following the Bt cotton performance. The scientists said that the weather fluctuations have caused the damage. It is surprising to see that all other cotton hybrids in the neighboring fields are better, given the same weather conditions. What is more striking is that wherever gap filling was done with non-bt cotton hybrids, the plants are healthy.

By Jana Vignyana Vedika:

These fact finding visits were conducted in eight blocks of three districts of Kurnool, Mahbubnagar and Warangal, covering 25 Bt Cotton farmers. This fact finding mission revealed:

- the incidence of bollworm is not very high this season. In the fields visited, both Bt and non-Bt have shown about 5-8% impact from Bollworm attack

- Upto November, even Bt Cotton had witnessed around 6 to 10 pesticide sprays on an average per acre. Only 2 of the 25 farmers met had used only 4 sprays

- Farmers have used very expensive as well as toxic pesticides on Bt Cotton these include quinalphos, profenophos, imidacloprid, monocrotophos, lambda-cyhalothrin, indoxacarb, everpectin, thiodicarb etc.

- In Warangal and Mahbubnagar districts, both in MECH 12 Bt and RCH2 Bt, around 10-25% of the plants were damaged by wilt. These plants cannot yield anything.

- In addition to approved varieties, farmers in Kurnool and Mahbubnagar are found to be using illegal Bt varieties too. The main attraction seems to be the lower cost (lower by around 200-300 rupees)

- Since there are no other commercial crops available, it has been found that farmers opt for Bt Cotton even in unsuitable soils

- In three quarters of the fields, aphids, white fly and spodoptera are likely to increase

- In all Bt varieties, drying up of the square and subsequent falling has been observed

By TNRMG (Telangana Natural Resource Management Group):

A team of 6 members including agriculture scientists visited four villages in Atmakur and Geesukonda mandals of Warangal district in the month of October these villages include Lingamadugupalli, Peddapur, Akkampeta and Mogilicherla. Findings are:

* it was found that fields of MECH 12 Bt and MECH 184 Bt consisted of unidentical plants which indicates spurious seeds to some extent.

* The flowering and cotton pod dropout rate is high and the crop looked dried up

* It was claimed that pesticide usage is not required for a period of 90 days but since the fields were infested with Helicoverpa and white fly, at the behest of pesticide dealers, farmers had sprayed pesticides like Tracer, Avaunt and Confidor.

* Farmers were lured to purchase the Bt seeds by coercive persuasion and demonstration of great returns. One way of luring the farmers is through advance bookings in the month of January itself, and by taking farmers to some "model farms" of the said varieties

One of the main points stressed by the TNRMG fact-finding visit report is the complete failure of regulation of aggressive marketing and spread of illegal varieties by the government and about the way farmers are being lured towards Bt Cotton.

SUMMING UP THE THREE YEARS

Hasty approval for commercial cultivation: The experience in the past three years with Bt Cotton shows the lack of comprehensive assessments at the trials stage itself, in addition to the legal violations of those trials. Data from elsewhere which needed India to take a precautionary approach to GMOs was conveniently ignored. Now, experimentation seems to be happening on which varieties would be suitable and so on, at the expense of hapless farmers.

More fundamental questions about the agricultural research priorities in this country how they are set and implemented arise from this experience.

Complete failure of regulatory mechanisms: There has been a complete failure of regulatory mechanisms right from the stage of field trials. The approval conditions demonstrate the non-practicability of certain conditions as well as the conflict of interest embodied in certain conditions where the company promoting Bt Cotton was also given the responsibility to monitor and so on. Currently, there is no accountability at the field level either for lack of monitoring or for failure of crop.

Even in cases where damage to the crop (where such damage is not reported or witnessed with the local non-Bt hybrids) has been established officially through survey teams, compensation could not be ensured for even one farmer. It is often heard by not just the seed industry people but even by the government representatives that paying compensation to even one farmer opens up a floodgate of demands from others however, this is no reason why farmers who have genuinely incurred losses cannot be identified through a suitable system and why they cannot be compensated.

The spread of illegal and unapproved varieties of Bt Cotton is another major evidence for the failure of regulation. These varieties are proliferating unchecked without paying heed to medium and long term impacts of bollworm resistance to Bt Cotton building up. In the immediate term, farmers cannot make anyone accountable for any losses that they incur with these varieties.

Monitoring systems highly questionable: The monitoring of Bt Cotton that has happened over the past three years is highly questionable. On the one hand is evidence of patent falsification of records. On the other hand is the media hype that the company has created with results that its commissioned surveys have ‘revealed’. There is a general non-transparent way of functioning that the government itself is adopting. There is no independent assessment happening and no recognition to data produced by other agencies.

On top of this are questions related to broad-based assessment of the GM crop in all its implications. The sampling being used by the monitoring systems is questionable as well as the times at which such monitoring is being done.

Extremely uneven performance by the crop and failure of the technology: The experience with Bt Cotton in the past three years has shown extremely uneven performance across different states, across different districts within each state, across varieties and also across the past three years. Bt Cotton, as per AP government’s official data, has failed in the first year. In the third year also, compensation has been ordered for loss-incurring farmers. A variety of agronomic and other problems have been witnessed with Bt Cotton including increased outbreak of pests and diseases, compared to other non-Bt hybrids. Their ability to withstand stress has also been found to be low. There are informal reports from farmers that in those cases where Bt Cotton has been grown in all the past three years, bollworm incidence is noted to be increasing indicating resistance build-up.

Any variety or technology that is not stable or uniform is a failure and Bt Cotton has therefore failed in India.

Safer and better alternatives ignored: Bt Cotton was introduced by conveniently ignoring safer and better alternatives that exist in this country. There is very successful experience with organic and Non-Pesticidal Management (NPM) approaches to crop cultivation in states like Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. These approaches are both eco-friendly and economically viable. The very pest management paradigm that the scientific establishment has adopted first with pesticides and now with a crop like Bt Cotton needs to be recast.

Bt Cotton was conveniently sought to fit into an IPM framework by the government and the company. However, the constant release of an endotoxin at lethal levels for a major part of the season is itself antithetical to the IPM approach. IPM is a knowledge-intensive approach whereas Bt Cotton as its cultivation is being practiced shows a large level of ignorance in the farmers' understanding of the Bt technology. There are a variety of understandings with regard to Bt Cotton.

No accountability being fixed: many of the promises being made by the companies as well as sellers of illegal varieties do not get covered by the existing legislations which are ostensibly existing to protect farmers’ interests. The current failure of Bt Cotton in Andhra Pradesh, if there is political will, can be brought under the purview of the PVPFR Act or the MoU system. However, governments are finding it difficult to do so. Similarly, for a farmer to take protection under the Consumer Act is very difficult. There are a variety of propaganda and marketing mechanisms being used by the companies which cannot be easily controlled by the government.

On the other hand, there are issues related to bio-safety too. Refuge criteria laid down during the approval are being violated openly given the practical constraints that Indian farmers face. This might mean a faster building up of resistance which would affect both Bt Cotton farmers and non-Bt cotton farmers. Who is going to be accountable for these medium and long term effects?

Farmers' true needs not being met: what the farmers need are seeds that perform well on all fronts. While bollworm resistance is only one additional parameter that the Bt Cotton companies offer to farmers, should not varieties be judged by their overall crop performance? Does it help the farmer that there is less bollworm incidence but that the crop is lost since there has been heavy flower/boll fall, even after having paid exorbitant prices for the seed? There are Indian studies also done by the official bodies concerned about secondary pests being higher in Bt Cotton. Therefore, does it help that the farmers might reduce their pesticide costs on bollworm but increase it on other pests and diseases?

Finally, before we end the report, we would like to counterpose our arguments to a few arguments thrown at people who are demanding a revoking of the approval of Bt Cotton in this country. The industry as well as the government have found a few convenient arguments with which to arm themselves, despite several studies and reports showcasing the extremely uneven, unpredictable and erratic performance of Bt Cotton.

What they would like to argue in their defence, even as the Bt crop failed
.. What we say
..

-XYZ problem has been seen across all varieties, including conventional hybrids this year and it is not just in Bt Cotton

This is simply not true as official surveys in 2002-03 also indicate Bt was found to be more susceptible to stress conditions and there was large scale drying up noted; in the third year, the bumper crop in cotton cannot be explained if all varieties including conventional hybrids had failed with the problems that afflicated Bt Cotton

-"Bt technology" has not failed since it has been seen to be effective against bollworm Bt crop could have failed here and there

An argument mostly heard from the scientific establishment where they think that performance of Bt cotton had suffered because of the insertion of the Bt gene into not-so-well-performing hybrids. Our question to them is:*

Can the technology be termed as successful if bollworm has been controlled to an extent but results in a resurgence of sucking pests and diseases?*

Can the technology be termed a success if resistance in the pests is already showing even in layperson observations by farmers?*

Can the technology be termed a success if farmers end up using the same amount of sprays for pesticides, now to control increased pests? The difference in pesticide sprays even for bollworm in various studies was found to range between 1-2 sprays.

Finally, how does this "success" explain the continued incidence of bollworm too in many fields visited by several fact finding teams? How about the comeback by the pesticides after 90 days or so? Is it enough that a seed that a farmer buys has one prominent characteristic (resistance to bollworm) but fails in many other ways? How does this fit into the conventional assessments and decision-making that farmers have made about which seed to use? Any technology and product that is not uniform and stable - and even by the definition used for the registration of plant varieties, any variety that does not exhibit uniformity and stability, - is a failure. Given the extremely uneven performance of Bt Cotton, including two years of large scale failure in Andhra Pradesh, it has to be declared as a failure.

*Why is it catching up so much if it was not popular? Hasn't the worldwide extent increased? Haven’t the markets of these companies increased? Have not other companies started inserting the gene too under license from Monsanto? Has not the spread of illegal Bt Cotton been phenomenal?
Even the Minister for Agriculture in Andhra Pradesh had something to say about the vested interests and false propaganda surrounding the spread of Bt Cotton.

In India, approved Bt Varieties occupy less than 6% of the cotton area. If the area increases, it is because of a multitude of corporate strategies including sub-licensing of the Bt technology to many local companies that the farmers trust.

The aggressive marketing strategies of Bt Cotton companies are worth taking note of. On a product that is supposed to bring down the use of pesticides, free pesticides are given as an incentive! There are carefully identified seed agents and representatives in each village where marketing happens often times, they are the relatives of seed dealers who, after having paid huge advance deposits with the companies, have a stake in selling off their stocks. 2003-04 has also witnessed seed being sold on credit, to be settled in cash paid in regular instalments, in some places in Warangal district. Advertisements that look uncannily similar to news reports, lauding the performance of Bt Cotton are placed in the local papers.

Initial propaganda written as well as unwritten makes a variety of promises to farmers including on increased yields and better quality of produce. Farmers are lured by such propaganda.

It is important that the government regulate such propaganda and that the companies come out with data on how much monies are being spent on propaganda and marketing at all levels in the Bt Cotton supply chain.

Why would the farmers be willing to spend Rs. 1600/- per acre if it Bt Cotton not effective?

Farmers are being lured by a variety of means to go in for Bt Cotton * given the high-value, low-volume pesticides that are popular in the market now, farmers believe that investing in expensive seed which could bring down pesticide use is better but as experience shows, farmers ultimately end up spending a lot on the expensive seed as well as on expensive pesticides.

*Isn't RCH2 Bt's success an evidence for the success of Bt Cotton?

A much hyped reasoning heard throughout the season is that Raasi's RCH2 Bt has performed extremely well and that farmers are very happy with it

If RCH2Bt is working better than MECH Bt, then obviously it is a varietal characteristic. Our own fact finding visits contradict this uniformly superior performance of RCH2 Bt. RCH2 Bt seemed to show better results when it comes to yields, given that it is a high-yielding variety but when it comes to vulnerability to pests and diseases, there was not much difference seen between RCH2 and other Bt Cotton hybrids and the number of pesticide sprays on the crop. The overall economics favor RCH2 Bt slightly but this is not to say that its performance is better than some of the best performing non-Bt hybrids

in Nalgonda district, the JDA Committee received complaints on the failure of RCH2 Bt and after investigations, the Committee ordered the company to pay compensation. This is an indicator of its performance

*Why should farmers worry about resistance when it is 10-15 years away? Isn't that the average age of pesticides too?

Except for the CICR study, other resistance studies even within India point out to resistance building up much earlier than 10 years, and probably within 5-6 years; such resistance is likely to build up much faster given that resistance management strategies are not followed on the ground. Gujarat farmers are reportedly now seeking 2-gene Bt Cotton to solve their problems. Farmers are already reporting that in their own observation, they found that Bt Cotton grown continuously for three years meant higher and higher incidence of bollworm. It is not just the farmers who are growing Bt Cotton who need to worry about resistance but farmers who are their neighbors too. Ultimately, more than the farmers it is a responsible government that has to worry about resistance and therefore, take a precautionary approach. Also, it is the companies which are jumping on the Bt Cotton bandwagon which will ultimately lose out in this story

*Farmers are free to go in for, or reject Bt Cotton

There is no informed choice happening* The choices are getting narrower and narrower with many companies going in for Bt technology from Monsanto. In effect, there would be no choice soon.

*There are adequate mechanisms in place to protect farmers' interests

Experience right from the first year has shown that there are no mechanisms to fix accountability on the company in the existing laws or systems like the MoU system of Andhra Pradesh. Even in cases where the government's own data reports failure, farmers' interests were not protected.

In this scenario of erratic and illegal Bt Cotton proliferation, we demand that the government look seriously at its pest management paradigm and at successful, sustainable alternatives. Rich experience with alternatives is present all over the country with many farmers and non-governmental organizations and it is not too late for the government to revoke its approval of Bt cotton cultivation and to focus on promoting and supporting such alternatives. The government should also hold the company accountable for all the losses incurred so far.

References:

1. "Corporate Hijack of Biodiversity": Dr Vandana Shiva, Radha Holla Bhar and Afsar Jafri, Navdanya, December 2002

2. "A Lesson from the Field": Asha Krishnakumar, May 24 June 6, 2003, FrontLine

3. "Background Note on Bt Cotton Cultivation in India", on the website of the Ministry of Environment and Forests

4. "Bt Cotton Confusion Prevails", Suman Sahai, EPW, June 19, 2002

5. "Local Pests Take the Bite out of Bt Cotton", Financial Express, August 10, 2002

6. "Bt Cotton Bitter Harvest": Debashis Banerjee and Mihir Shah, The Hindu, August 24, 2002

7. "Status of Bt Cotton and its Performance": internal document of the Department of Agriculture, Government of Andhra Pradesh, submitted to the Legislative Assembly by the Minister for Agriculture

8. "Preliminary Report on the Performance of Bt Cotton in Mahbubnagar District", internal document from the Director of Research, ANGRAU, Hyderabad

9. "A lesson from the Field", Asha Krishnakumar, Frontline May 24-June 6 2003

10. 10. Barwale, R.B., Gadwal, V.R., Zehr, U., & Zehr, B. (2004). Prospects for Bt cotton technology in India. AgBioForum, 7(1&2), 23-26. Available on the World Wide Web: http://www.agbioforum.org/

11. "Corporate Hijack of Biodiversity": Dr Vandana Shiva, Radha Holla Bhar and Afsar Jafri, Navdanya, December 2002

12. "Dakshina Telangana Mandalamlo Bt patthi survey phalithaalu", Dr K Suhasini, Palam, Mahbubnagar in Paadi Pantalu, July 2003

Annexure 1:

Conditions Stipulated by GEAC:

(i) The period of validity of approval is three years from April 2002 March 2005.
(ii) Every field where Bt cotton is planted shall be fully surrounded by a belt of land called ‘refuge’ in which the same non-Bt cotton variety shall be sown. The size of the refuge belt should be such as to take at least five rows of non-Bt cotton or shall be 20% of total sown area whichever is more.
(iii) To facilitate this, each packet of seeds of the approved varieties should also contain a separate packet of the seeds of the same non-Bt cotton variety which is sufficient for planting in the refuge defined above.
(iv) Each packet should be appropriately labeled indicating the contents and the description of the Bt hybrid including the name of the transgene, the GEAC approval reference, physical and genetic purity of the seeds. The packet should also contain detailed directions for use including sowing pattern, pest management, suitability of agro-climatic conditions etc., in vernacular language.
(v) MAHYCO will enter into agreements with their dealers/agents, that will specify the requirements from dealers/agents to provide details about the sale of seeds, acreage cultivated, and state/regions where Bt cotton is sown.
(vi) MAHYCO will prepare annual reports by 31st March each year on the use of Bt cotton hybrid varieties by dealers, acreage, locality (state and region) and submit the same in electronic form to GEAC, if asked for by the GEAC.
(vii) MAHYCO will develop plans for Bt based Integrated Pest Management and include this information in the seed packet.
(viii) MAHYCO will monitor annually the susceptibility of bollworms to Bt gene vis-à-vis baseline susceptibility data and submit data relating to resistance development, if any, to GEAC.
(ix) Monitoring of susceptibility of bollworms to the Bt gene will also be undertaken by an agency identified by the Ministry of Environment and Forests at applicant’s cost. The Ministry has entrusted Central Institute for Cotton research, Nagpur to carry out the above monitoring.
(x) MAHYCO will undertake an awareness and education programme, interalia through development and distribution of educational material on Bt cotton, for farmers, dealers and others.
(xi) MAHYCO will also continue to undertake studies on possible impacts on non-target insects and crops, and report back to GEAC annually.
(xii) The label on each packet of seeds, and the instruction manual inside the packet should contain all relevant information.
(xiii) MAHYCO will deposit 100 g seed each of approved hybrids as well as their parental lines with the National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources (NBPGR).
(xiv) MAHYCO will develop and deposit with the NBPGR, the DNA fingerprints of the approved varieties.
(xv) MAHYCO will also provide to the NBPGR, the testing procedures for identifying transgenic traits in the approved varieties by DNA and protein methods