Here's another powerful response - this time from PV Satheesh - to the article in India's 'Economic & Political Weekly' (April 9th 2005) on Bt Cotton by Qaim and Zilberman et al.

Qaim and Zilberman's piece, "Bt Cotton Controversy: Some Paradoxes Explained", attempted to question all the studies that have shown problems with Monsanto's Bollgard (Bt) cotton in India and to explain the problems with the Bt plants as arising from "susceptible germplasm" rather than locally adapted cultivars.

In other words, Qaim and Zilberman attempt to argue that there are no problems arising from genetic modification per se, it's all down to unsuitable varities. Here's an excerpt from Satheesh's telling response to the article.

"In our conversation in Bangalore, I recounted a revealing experience of mine to Dr Qaim. In Haveri District of Karnataka, a farmer who was also a dealer of Monsanto Bollgard [Bt] cotton, took me to his four acre farm to show me the performance of the Bollgard cotton. The farm was sliced into four parts with three parts being planted with non Bt hybrids. One acre was sporting Bollgard cotton. It was a dramatic sight. The entire non Bt was fresh, green and heavy with cotton bolls. The Bt field had completely wilted with no cotton, no bolls and dried twigs. One could have dismissed that with the argument of the learned authors that the susceptible germplasm had failed whereas the locally adapted cultivar had triumphed. But this conclusion evaporated when I went close to the Bt field. The rows of Refugia [the lines of the same germplasm as Bt but without having been injected Bt genes into them] which were planted all along the Bt field, were fresh, and with bolls. It was only the Bt plants which had withered away. There was no better dramatic proof than the total failure of the Bollgard than this."
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Papering over Bt controversy: Corporate science creates more paradoxes

The article Bt Cotton Controversy [EPW, April 9, 2005] has proved the ability of corporate science to create more paradoxes than it seeks to explain.

To begin with, let us examine the statement that "independent studies under practical farming conditions are not available for India, and therefore, it is difficult to interpret the statements made by different interest groups."

This is a strange statement since there exists a report called Did Bt Cotton Save Farmers in Warangal?[DBCSFW] which studied nearly 10% of all farmers who grew Bt cotton in Warangal District in Andhra Pradesh, the first state to welcome Bt cotton. The study DBCSFW was the first ever independent study in India that closely worked with farmers to collect the data and their perceptions on a weekly basis. There is hardly another matching study in India, whether independent or company-sponsored, which had examined the performance of Bt Cotton under, what the authors of the Bt Cotton Controversy call, practical farming conditions. [see www.ddsindia.com for details]. World over this study finds an important reference in discussions on Bt Cotton. Major independent global groups like GM Watch, Third World Network, GRAIN have based a number of their analyses on this study. Groups in West Africa, South Africa, South East Asia and Meso America have used this study in their major discussions on Bt Cotton.

Therefore it is very interesting that Dr Qaim, who is clearly aware of this study [he had a long argument about this study with me in a Biotechnology Conference at Bangalore in February this year], is a party to the above statement. Probably this is a case of chosen amnesia. It is also significant that the authors have decided not to refer to this study anywhere in their scholarly article.

In early 2003, we carried out an interview based survey of 341 cotton farmers in four states of India, state the authors and further explain that this was done in 10 different districts and 58 villages. This explains the totally unrepresentative character of the survey and the sketchiness of the data collected. Considering that the 90,000 acres planted under Bt cotton in India in 2002 divided themselves into an approximate holding size of three acres, there would be at least 30,000 farmers who were farming Bt. Therefore the sample of 341 farmers that the Naik et al selected constitute less than 1% of the Bt farmers, an extremely insignificant sample size, especially when one is trying to explain paradoxes. Given the overall controversy surrounding Genetically Modified crops across the world, this subject needs to cover not only wider area but also for a number of seasons with proper representations of the different farming categories to draw valid conclusions.

Basing a study on interview schedule for Indian farmers borders on ridiculousness. Most Indian farmers are not used to keeping their farming accounts. They can only recall it by memory, which can be sketchy at times. Therefore an interview schedule, while dealing with farmers, can go awfully awry. This is a fundamental flaw with the study. Since the time cultivation of Bt cotton started in India, Mahyco Monsanto has continuously defended its product by commissioning studies that use season-end interview schedules in spite of a clear knowledge by the researchers that such schedules will invariably generate unreliable data. It is precisely for these reasons, that one finds it curious that the authors chose to ignore a study like the DBCSWF which had painstakingly collected in situ data from farmers almost on a day to day basis and had used the data to a collective monthly analysis.

Pesticidal use

It is noone's contention that Bt cotton provides protection against sucking pests and the entire bollworm complex. But what the authors of Bt Cotton Controversy have conveniently left unmentioned is that by targeting one insect pest, Bt cotton has created an imbalance in the pest population and generated in some cases, a virulent increase in the population of sucking pests and other bollworms like pink bollworm and spodaptera thereby subjecting cotton crop to a severe attack from these pests, forcing farmers to spray several times more to contain these pests than they had done previously.

Because of this reason, the difference between the pesticide sprays done by Bt and Non Bt farmers was statistically insignificant. The statement by the authors that insecticide spray in 2002-2003 was reduced by 50% is either a figment of imagination or the product of a faulty data or both. As the results from the season long study in AP pointed out, the pesticide reduction in volume was just about 10% and in terms of cost an insignificant Rs.200 which accounts for just about 6% of the expenditure on plant protection and a miniscule 2% of the total cost of cultivation by non Bt farmers.

Usage of pesticides before and after 90 days of crop duration

S no Pest on which chemical spray was taken up Cost of plant protection on Bt Cost of plant protection on Non Bt
Before 90 days
(Rs) After 90 days
(Rs) Before 90 days (Rs) After 90 days (Rs)
1 Sucking pests 955/- (30%) 86/- (3%) 998/- (29%) 102/- (3%)
2 Bollworms 432/- (13%) 1713/- (54%) 439/- (13%) 1871/- (55%)
3 Total 1387/- (43%) 1799/- (57%) 1437/- (42%) 1973/- (58%)

As can be seen from the above table, the total cost involved in fighting different pests was as follows:

Type of pest attack Expenditure incurred: Total and as % of cost of cultivation
Bt Non-Bt

C Bollworm: Rs 2145/- (67%) Rs 2310/- (68%)
C Sucking pests: Rs 1041/- (33%) Rs 1100/- (32%)
C Total Rs 3186/- (100%) Rs 3410/- (100%)

Source: Did Bt Cotton Save Farmers in Warangal? 2003

It is important to note that the cost of plant protection on Bt and Non Bt during the first 90 days of crop was almost the same 13% of the overall expenditure on plant protection.

In terms of absolute costs the difference was a paltry seven rupees. This negated the fundamental claim by the GE industry that Bt in cotton plants completely avoids pesticide spray.

In the light of this data and the subsequent data made available by the study for the years 2003-4 and 2004-5, it becomes obvious that Dr Qaim et al were trying to tailor their Indian data to suit their previous "studies" in Argentina so as to come to a global conclusion. It is another matter that the Qaim study for Argentina establishes a pernicious theory of the superiority of the technology over the farmer. It simply states that "small farmers may not be able to absorb the technology" [emphasis mine]. Considering that "small farmer" in Argentina is a holder of up to 70 hectares of land, this argument is the most convenient way of papering over the failure of the technology by shifting the blame on to the farmer. The same rhetoric repeats in another part of their paper when they say that (farmers were) not able exploit the advantages of Bt technology.

It is not that this is an isolated example. In a Biotechnology Public Consultation held at Tirupati in Andhra Pradesh, Dr Kameswara Rao, a well known apologist for Bt Cotton had stated openly [believe me this is true] "I realised that Indian farmers don't know how to grow cotton". The attempt behind these examples is simple. Remove farmers from farming by making them believe that they are incapable of cultivating crops, and force them to hand over their agriculture to a predatory corporate regime.

It is this patronising attitude towards farmers which probably makes the authors deliver a homily that Bt adopters in Andhra Pradesh could have further reduced their insecticide applications. As the above tables conclusively prove, any reduction in sprays by Bt farmers in AP would have pushed them to a total disaster. In 2002, there was wide spread wilt and increased attack of pests on left over crop from November 2002 onwards mostly belonging to sucking pest complex besides Heliocoverpa. Wilt and sucking pests were also reported by the Departmental committees of the states of Gujarat, Karnataka besides Andhra Pradesh, causing severe damage. Farmer after farmer who has been a part of the DBCSFW has told us how he was forced to spray against his will just to save whatever was left of his crop. Therefore the gentle advice by the armchair scientists is only an attempt to rub salt on the wound.

The paper Bt Cotton Controversy also gets into the yield debate and here again the authors present an incredulous argument that Bt technology in India had a positive impact on yields. How economical with truth that you can get? In actuality, the positive impact that the farmers claim manifested in different parts of India in the following manner:

* In Andhra Pradesh Bt farmers harvested 35% less cotton than their Non Bt counterparts. While net earning for Bt faremers was (-)1295 rupees, the non Bt farmers were able to gain (+)5368 rupees.

* The newspaper headlines in Maharashtra in 2002 graphically depicted the plight of Bt farmers:
1. "30,000 hectares BT-Cotton crops damaged and over Rs. 500-crore
losses are reported"; in Deshonnati Sep.2, 2002.

2. "In Umrked Taluka over 70 per cent Bt cotton crop is attacked by root
rot", in Navrashtra Sep 1, 2002.

3. "1800 Acres BT- Cotton crop burnt due to wilt" in Lokmat, August 29,
2002.
* Similar reports of the failure of Bt cotton also came from Madhya Pradesh.
All this is now being so strangely distorted by the Bt apologists who actually in an describe such huge losses suffered by farmers as substantial yield increases!! And they make a little concession to Andhra Pradesh in 2002 by describing the enormous losses suffered by farmers as slightly negative. Can you think of a better definition for Orwellian Speak?

In actuality the huge losses suffered by Bt Cotton farmers forced the then Telugu Desam Government in Andhra Pradesh, whom noone can blame of being anti-biotechnology, to officially issue a statement that Bt cotton was against the interests of small farmers. Therefore it is impossible to understand, how against irrefutable evidence, the authors are able to speak of substantial yield increases.

Finally, the cat comes out of the bag when dealing with the reports that Bt adopters suffered more from drought or viral and fungal infections are due to genetic technology as such are not correct. If the germplasm is more susceptible to drought than a locally adapted cultivar, the Bt hybrid will underperform in a dry spell especially when bollworm pressure is low.

In our conversation in Bangalore, I recounted a revealing experience of mine to Dr Qaim. In Haveri District of Karnataka, a farmer who was also a dealer of Monsanto Bollgard cotton, took me to his four acre farm to show me the performance of the Bollgard cotton. The farm was sliced into four parts with three parts being planted with non Bt hybrids. One acre was sporting Bollgard cotton. It was a dramatic sight. The entire non Bt was fresh, green and heavy with cotton bolls. The Bt field had completely wilted with no cotton, no bolls and dried twigs. One could have dismissed that with the argument of the learned authors that the susceptible germplasm had failed whereas the locally adapted cultivar had triumphed. But this conclusion evaporated when I went close to the Bt field. The rows of Refugia [the lines of the same germplasm as Bt but without having been injected Bt genes into them] which were planted all along the Bt field, were fresh, and with bolls. It was only the Bt plants which had withered away. There was no better dramatic proof than the total failure of the Bollgard than this.

The same failure of the Bollgard cotton Mech Bt 12, Mech Bt 162 and Mech Bt 184 are visible in the three year study of Bollgard in Andhra Pradesh titled Bt Cotton In Andhra Pradesh: A Three Year Assessment. The table below summarises what happened to it.

Year-wise performance of Mahyco-Monsanto Bt hybrids [MECH Bt] and Non-Bt
hybrids since 2002-03 to 2004-05

2002-03 2003-04 2004-05
Economics of cultivation of Bt and Non Bt crops and the % of expenditure to the total cost of cultivation
Description (Costs / acre) MECH Bt Non Bt Gain with BT MECH Bt Non Bt Gain with BT MECH Bt Non Bt Gain with BT
Seed cost (Rs/acre) 1600
(15%) 450
(5%) -1150 1469
(12%) 445
(4%) -1024 1602
(13%) 505
(5%) -1097
Pest management cost (Rs/acre) 2909
(27%) 2971
(31%) 62 2287
(19%) 2608
(23%) 321 2518
(21%) 2719
(26%) 201
total costs of cultivation (Rs/acre) 10655 9653 -1002 12030 11127 -903 12088 10230 -1858
Yield (kg/acre) 450 690 -240 827 800 27 670 635 35
Net returns (Rs/acre) -1295 5368 -6663 7650 8401 -751 -252 597 -849
(Figures in parenthesis denote percentage to the total cot of cultivation)

[p v satheesh]
with support from Dr Abdul Qayum