THIS IS A "MUST READ" ON BIOTECH INDUSTRY PROPAGANDA OVER AFRICA - A BRILLIANTLY CLEAR AND CAREFULLY REFERENCED ANALYSIS

Below we reproduce one of the final sections of the new report by Aaron deGrassi of the Institute of Development Studies, at the University of Sussex, UK, on whether GM crops are addressing the real causes of poverty and hunger in Africa.

After a careful empirical analysis of the actual results of the use of GM crops in Africa, deGrassi analyses why the crops are attracting so much attention and "excitement" in this regard when the actual results are so unremarkable, "much lower than with either conventional breeding or agroecology-based techniques".

In that context deGrassi analyses how biotechnology firms have eagerly used ostensibly philanthropic African projects for public relations purposes.

Here's a telling, and again carefuly referenced, excerpt from deGrassi's report on the PR use of South African GM cotton farmers. It's followed by the full section on 'Trade Wars and Media Campaigns' in the report, together with the relevant references. PLEASE CIRCULATE WIDELY.

EVERYONE WHO ATTENDED THE MINISTERIAL IN SACRAMENTO SHOULD BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS REPORT.

EXCERPT:

"...[South African GM (Bt) cotton farmer] Buthelezi was by Zoellick's side when the Trade Secretary formally announced a US WTO case against EU restrictions on GM imports. A month later, the Administrator of USAID, Andrew Natsios, described Buthelezi before a Congressional panel on plant biotechnology in Africa.

However, Buthelezi's experience may be unique. The Council for Biotechnology Information calls him a "small farmer," and others describe his life as "hand-to-mouth existence." Administrator Natsios called described him as a "small farmer . struggling just at the subsistence level." However, independent reporters have revealed that, with two wives and more than 66 acres, he is one of the largest farmers in Makhathini and chairs the area's farmers' federation encompassing 48 farmers' associations.385

For Monsanto, Buthelezi and his stories are part of the firm's declared strategy of "gaining global acceptance of biotechnology."386 Just before President Bush's May 2003 speech claiming that Europe's import restrictions exacerbate African hunger, Monsanto flew four black South African GM crop farmers to London, where they spoke at a private conference hosted by the Commonwealth Business Council, before heading on to Denmark and Germany. Like Buthelezi, these "representative farmers" read statements carefully scripted by Monsanto and own dozens of acres of land. Several actually spend most of their time working at their day jobs as school administrators. Others pro-biotech campaigners have caught on: CropGen, for instance, celebrates another South African farmer, Mbongeni Nxumalo.387

These South African farmers-whom representatives of Monsanto and other businesses call "basically representative farmers" and "representatives of the African smallholding community"-are plucked from South Africa, wined and dined, and given scripted statements about the benefits of GM.388 In an area where most farmers cultivate just a few hectares, and only half the population can read, Monsanto's "representative" farmers are school administrators and agricultural college graduates, owning dozens of hectares of land.389 Monsanto has been criticized for using these farmers as a part of a deliberate attempt to distort public debate on biotechnology.390 Critics have coined the nickname "Bt Buthelezi," to illustrate this farmer's unconditional support to Bt cotton: during a trip to Monsanto's headquarters in St. Louis, Buthelezi was quoted as saying, "I wouldn't care if it were from the devil himself."391 "
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The full report can be downloaded as a pdf from here:
http://allafrica.com/sustainable/resources/00010161.html
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Trade Wars and Media Campaigns

(taken from Aaron deGrassi's report Genetically Modified Crops and Sustainable Poverty Alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Assessment of Current Evidence)

To crack open lucrative markets worldwide, biotechnology corporations are seeking public legitimacy for genetically engineered crops by turning their PR machines upon small farmers in Africa. Industry-funded groups are increasingly using Africans to misinform publics in both industrialized and developing nations.

Monsanto and the handful of other corporations who dominate the international trade in agricultural inputs had staked their future on transforming themselves from inputs and pharmaceuticals to the 'life-sciences.'

In Europe's lucrative markets, however, the biotech industry has been rebuked by a moratorium on genetically modified organisms.373 If the ban was lifted, US agribusinesses could reap $300 million a year on corn exports alone; total biotech exports could figure in the billions.374 Monsanto, whose stock fell almost 50% during 2002, joined farm lobby groups in pressuring the Bush Administration to take action in the World Trade Organization (WTO) against Europe. They hope the case will establish a precedent prohibiting GM-restrictions throughout the world.375 Because relations between the US and EU are already tense-over Iraq and US farm subsidies and steel tariffs-the biotech industry has turned to a more subtle public relations drive to gain European acceptance of GM.

They have begun using "the poverty card," suggesting that Europe's resistance "impedes the global use of a technology that could be of great benefit to farmers and consumers around the world."376

In the US Congress, the interests of American exporters are clearer: "We have been told to expect good news on behalf of American agriculture," said a spokesman for the Speaker of the House of Representatives.377 The Director of Public Policy at the American Farm Bureau Federation described, "We rely on export markets for one-third of our crops; this [ban] is a nightmare."378

Biotechnology companies had earlier come under scrutiny in several high-publicity episodes. First, Novartis (now Syngenta) signed a controversial deal with the University of California at Berkeley, giving the company influence over the course of academic research and rights to patent resulting innovations in exchange for a $25 million grant. Second, Starlink GM corn, which had not been approved for human consumption, wound up in many granaries and food products. Later, experiments seemed to show that GM corn had negative impacts upon secondary insects, such as the Monarch butterfly. Then research revealed that GM corn had found its way in to farmers' fields in Mexico-the place of origin and center of diversity for maize-despite prohibitions on the crop. After this story made it to the cover of the influential weekly magazine Time, scientists suggested that it was just a matter of time before seed banks preserving genetic diversity became contaminated with GM corn. Recently, the US has been condemned for providing exclusively GM food aid, when countries facing food shortages have specified they would rather prefer the unmodified supplies widely available in the US, in Africa and throughout the world.379

Under threat in an industry that depends on a positive popular image, minimal and friendly regulations, and generous public financing, biotechnology corporations joined together to devote $50 million dollars to a publicity campaign.380 Corporations have bussed in pro-GM protestors, invented fictitious front people to level slander, and turned towards Africa has proof that genetic modification is essential to end world hunger.381

Finding African "Representatives"

To bolster its claims about the benefits of biotech crops, Monsanto has funded T.J. Buthelezi, a clean-shaven, middle-aged black farmer from Makhathini, to act as an African representative. He has told of his positive experiences with Bt cotton (in terms suspiciously similar to Monsanto press releases) at conferences and events around the world.382 In October 2001, Buthelezi met US Congress members and attended a Summit by the US  Corporate Council on Africa. Several months later, Monsanto paid for him to have lunch with US Trade Secretary Robert Zoellick at the company's office near Pretoria.383 In August of last year, Buthelezi and Monsanto organized pro-biotech booths, interviews and rallies at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. Buthelezi's name and face now commonly appear on the internet and briefings for policy makers.384 In May 2003, Buthelezi was by Zoellick's side when the Trade Secretary formally announced a US WTO case against EU restrictions on GM imports. A month later, the Administrator of USAID, Andrew Natsios, described Buthelezi before a Congressional panel on plant biotechnology in Africa.

However, Buthelezi's experience may be unique. The Council for Biotechnology Information calls him a "small farmer," and others describe his life as "hand-to-mouth existence." Administrator Natsios called described him as a "small farmer . struggling just at the subsistence level." However, independent reporters have revealed that, with two wives and more than 66 acres, he is one of the largest farmers in Makhathini and chairs the area's farmers' federation encompassing 48 farmers' associations.385

For Monsanto, Buthelezi and his stories are part of the firm's declared strategy of "gaining global acceptance of biotechnology."386 Just before President Bush's May 2003 speech claiming that Europe's import restrictions exacerbate African hunger, Monsanto flew four black South African GM crop farmers to London, where they spoke at a private conference hosted by the Commonwealth Business Council, before heading on to Denmark and Germany. Like Buthelezi, these "representative farmers" read statements carefully scripted by Monsanto and own dozens of acres of land. Several actually spend most of their time working at their day jobs as school administrators. Others pro-biotech campaigners have caught on: CropGen, for instance, celebrates another South African farmer, Mbongeni Nxumalo.387

These South African farmers-whom representatives of Monsanto and other businesses call "basically representative farmers" and "representatives of the African smallholding community"-are plucked from South Africa, wined and dined, and given scripted statements about the benefits of GM.388 In an area where most farmers cultivate just a few hectares, and only half the population can read, Monsanto's "representative" farmers are school administrators and agricultural college graduates, owning dozens of hectares of land.389 Monsanto has been criticized for using these farmers as a part of a deliberate attempt to distort public debate on biotechnology.390 Critics have coined the nickname "Bt Buthelezi," to illustrate this farmer's unconditional support to Bt cotton: during a trip to Monsanto's headquarters in St. Louis, Buthelezi was quoted as saying, "I wouldn't care if it were from the devil himself."391

For several years, Monsanto has attempted to cement the adoption of GMOs in Africa. In 1998, the company bought out Cargill's seed operations in Africa.392 A year later, Monsanto attempted to purchase a majority share in Zimbabwe's main cotton company in order to produce GM cotton seeds for Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Egypt.393 After being turned down in Zimbabwe, Monsanto unsuccessfully tried Zambia and Tanzania. It has since worked its way in to Kenya and Uganda and is attempting to introduce transgenic cotton there during the next growing season.394 Monsanto has pursed similar strategies with biotech maize in Uganda and South Africa.395

But Monsanto's activities in Africa make better public relations than actual business. The impoverished continent accounts for only small percent of Monsanto's sales (company representatives would not say how small). But Africa is fruitful for the firm's lobbying. In addition to establishing a newsletter and website for African biotechnology issues, Monsanto has recently paid journalists to visit Makhathini to "admire the virtues of Bt cotton."396 It has also tried to convince Zimbabweans now considering Bt cotton through videos, field trips, and presentations.397 Adds in magazines tout the experience, and at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, Monsanto organized the presence of Makhathini farmers at the conference for pro-biotech rallies and dinner outings.398

Florence Wambugu, the Kenyan sweet potato scientists, has become an influential advocate for the biotechnology industry. After her work with Monsanto and KARI, she headed ISAAA's Africa office, before establishing her own A Harvest Biotechnology Foundation International. Wambugu recognizes however, that "it [the modified sweet potato] has no commercial value to Monsanto, except as PR."399

ISAAA has created a Knowledge Center in Kenya with the primary purpose to "facilitate a knowledge-based, better informed public debate."400 The group has also spun off a number of innocuously named pro-biotech NGOs, such as the African Biotechnology Stakeholders' Forum and African Biotechnology Trust.401 Pro-biotech Western aid agencies have joined with theses organizations to quietly conduct one-sided conferences at up-scale venues around the continent, such as Kenya's Windsor Golf and Country Club, aimed to swing high-level officials in favor of GM.402

But critics charge these forums are facades for large corporations.403 The NGOs consist of a website and a few staff, they charge. They also point out that ISAAA is funded by Agro-Evo, Bayer, Cargill, Dow, Monsanto, Novartis, Pioneer, Syngenta, in addition to a dozen Western governmental aid agencies. The Board of Directors likewise has contained top biotech company executives, such as Wally Beversdorf, head of R&D at Novartis (now Syngenta). ISAAA, however, has no representatives from African farmer organizations.404

"There's a lot of propaganda," said Tewolde Egziabher, head of Ethiopia's Environmental Protection Authority in an interview with Greenpeace, "but there's absolutely no proof that these [transgenic] plants are more prolific."405 In 2000, Egzhiaber issued a joint letter by groups in Africa criticizing the "misleading simplification" of a British documentary, which, he argued, used "the image of the poor and the hungry from our countries" in order to "push a technology that is neither safe, environmentally friendly nor economically beneficial to us."406

After publicity of Iraq War subsided, the Bush administration renewed its campaign against regulations on GM. President Bush argued that EU's policies are harming poor African countries. The US Senate simultaneously passed a bill prohibiting financial aid for combating HIV/AIDS to those countries that decline GM food aid.407 Consequently, the Bush Administration has been accused of using the name of the poor ("poor-washing"), particularly Africans, in order to put a positive spin on its efforts to increase American exports.408

The Consequences

The result of these high-profile media campaigns is that actual empirical analysis of GM crops in Africa suffers. The link between EU regulations and African hunger was quickly criticized as far-fetched and misleading.409 There is little empirical evidence to support the claim that EU measures have "caused many African nations to avoid investing in biotechnologies, for fear their products will be shut out of European markets."410 African countries export neither maize nor sweet potatoes to Europe. The only potentially affected crop would be GM cotton, but South Africa does not export cotton to the EU; in fact, it imports cotton because it cannot meet domestic demand.411 Countries have not adopted biotechnologies not because of EU restrictions, but rather for other reasons, such as lack of suitable technologies, and lack of regulatory laws and capacity. Consequently, no sub-Saharan African nation joined the US's challenge to Europe's ban, and even Egypt withdrew from the complaint.412 In contrast, 20 African countries have filed petitions against the United State's own cotton subsidies.413

Another surprising example of advocacy trumping facts is C.S. Prakash, the influential biotechnology advocate who has advised the US Trade Representative. Prakash has repeatedly cited sweet potatoes as a positive example of the benefits of GM for African countries, but has confessed to having no knowledge of the results of scientific trials in Kenya.414

Also demonstrating the lack of empirical analysis, a major report on biotechnology by the UN Economic Commission for Africa drew its conclusions based primarily on hypothetical benefits and risks.415 During writing, the report was reviewed by numerous institutions in the United States, such as the World Bank and Harvard University, but not by a single organization in Africa, let alone representatives of poor farmers.416

Academics have not generally been as illuminating as one would hope. On the one hand, applied researchers involved with biotechnology do not have access to outside critical information, or fear it may jeopardize future funding or research. On the other hand, the whims of academia mean that non-project scholars focus on developing new theories and summarizing others' debates, rather than detailed, empirical evaluations. One consequence is the aforementioned overemphasis on novel risks in lieu of the more standard measures utilized in this report.417
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References from this section of the report:

373 The Economist (2002) 'The Grim Reaper', 22 Aug.
374 Reuters (2002a); King (2002b).
375 Reuters (2002a; 2002b); King (2002b; 2002a).
376 Robert Zoellick, quoted in US Trade Representative (2003).
377 Quoted in Crutsinger (2003).
378 Quoted in Becker and Barboza (2003).
379 Greenpeace (2002); Friends of the Earth International (2003b); Patel (2002).
380 Barboza (2000).
381 Monbiot (2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2002c); Matthews (2002); Pearce (2002).
382 Gilbert and Lee (2001). See also Buthelezi (2001).
383 King (2002b); Council for Biotechnology Information (2002).
384 E.g. FEST (2002); see also http://www.makcotton.co.za.
385 Council for Biotechnology Information (2002); Taitz (1999); Dispatch Online (2002).
386 Monsanto Company (2002: 32).
387 CropGen (2002).
388 Remarks by Shadrack Mabuza, Small Holder Development Manager of Monsanto-owned Carnia, and Peter Longworth, Director of the Commonwealth Business Council, respectively.
389 The farmers included Mr. Nhlela Phenious Gumede, Mr. Lazarous M. Sibiya, Ms. Thandiwe Andrettah Myeni, and Mr. Richard Sithole.
390 Dan Taylor, remarks at CBC meeting.
391 Gilbert and Lee (2001).
392 Pesticide Action Network Updates Service (2002) 'Monsanto sales down, CEO Out and Weed Resistance
Up', 20 Dec, http://www.panna.org.
393 Zimbabwe Independent (1999; 1998).
394 The Monitor (2002) 'Uganda to Grow GM cotton - Monsanto' (Kampala), 7 Sep; Ngatya, Kikonyogo (2002) 'Scientists Disagree on Biotech Cotton', New Vision (Uganda), 13 Feb.
395 Mutuma-Lule, A. (2002) 'Museveni Warned Over GM Foods', The East African (Nairobi), 11 Sep.; Kisambira, Edris (2002) 'Farmers Assured About GM Seeds', New Vision (Kampala), 20 Sep.; Cook, Louise (2000) 'Monsanto Buys All of Sensako', Business Day (Johannesburg), 14 Dec.
396 TVE person (2002) 'High tech harvest', op. cit. See website
http://www.monsantoafrica.com and newsletter
at http://www.monsantoafrica.com/kuza/default.htm.
397 Keeley and Scoones (2003b; 2003a).
398 Pearce (2002); Bates (2002); M'Mbijewe (2003).
399 Quoted in Fred Pearce 'Feeding Africa',
www.punjabilok.com/agriculture/africa1.htm, last accessed 26 Jan. 2003.
400 ISAAA (2002b: 27).
401 At an international level, there are numerous pseudo independent organizations as well, including The Science Media Centre, the Agricultural Biotechnology Council, International Policy Network, the Institute of Ideas, Sense about Science, and the Scientific Alliance (2003).
402 E.g. AfricaBio Conferences (www.africabio.org), a USAID conference in Ghana (Corey 2000), the UNIDO Consultative Meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, 20-23 March, 2003 (Miring'uh 2003a).
403 Kuyek (2000).
404 ISAAA (1999) 'Bi-Annual Report, 1997-1999',
http://www.isaaa.org/Publications/about_isaaa/Biennial_
report99/Biennial_report99.htm, accessed 23 Dec., 2002; ISAAA (2002) 'ISAAA in Brief',
http://www.isaaa.org/us/inbrief.htm, accessed 23, Dec., 2002.
405 Interview, Greenpeace, 208 Recipes Against Hunger,
http://www.txinfinet.com/ban-gef/01/9/9-11.HTML#4
406 quoted in Tayton (2000).
407 See Sharma (2003).
408 Food First (2003).
409 Becker and Barboza (2003); McAfee (2003).
410 Bush (2003).
411 Likewise, other countries such as Zambia and Uganda export cotton to South Africa and India; mostly West African cotton producers export to Europe, though US-textile import liberalization from the passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act may increase trade to the US.
412 The U.S. is acting with Argentina, Canada, and Egypt (withdrawn), with third parties including Australia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru and Uruguay (US Trade Representative 2003; Friends of the Earth International 2003a).
413 EU Business (2003); ISPNews (2003).
414 E.g. US Department of State (2002) "Biotech can be useful development tool, scientists say," Press Release
9 May, http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/biotech/02050901.htm.
Personal communication, C.S. Prakash, 2
Jun. 2003. Prakash (2000b; 2000a).
415 UNECA (2002: 80).
416 UNECA (2002: ix).
417 E.g. Altieri (2001); Tait and Bruce (2001); Wales and Mythen (2002);
Wolfenbarger and Phifer (2000); Beck
(1992; 1995; 1999); Wynne; Lash et al (1996); Krimsky and Golding (1992).
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"Genetically Modified Crops and Sustainable Poverty Alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Assessment of Current Evidence", can be downloaded as a pdf from here: http://allafrica.com/sustainable/resources/00010161.html