"Before reading this book, I was an enthusiastic supporter of biotechnology and genetically modified (GM) foods. Now I'm not so sure... I ascribed distrust of GM foods to ignorance or technophobia. After reading this book, I fear that my enthusiastic support resulted partly from ignorance - not of the science, but of the politics." - excerpt from the following article from BioMedNet magazine, 'HMS Beagle'.
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Trust Us, We're Experts: How Industry Manipulates Science and Gambles With Your Future
by Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber
Reviewed by Sibylle Hechtel
Posted August 31, 2001 * Issue 109
BioMedNet
BOOK REVIEW
http://news.bmn.com/hmsbeagle/109/reviews/review
It's not often you read a book that dramatically changes your outlook or opinions. Most books amuse, entertain, or inform. Trust Us, We're Experts shocks. It easily could lead the uninitiated to question their assumptions about "facts" and "truth" in the marketplace.
Authors Rampton and Stauber <http://www.prwatch.org/bios.html> of the Center for Media and Democracy ,http://www.prwatch.org/cmd/> chronicle the history of public relations, from Edward Bernays' laying the groundwork for the fledgling industry in the 1920s to the power it wields over public policy today. According to the authors, Bernays, a disciple of Sigmund Freud, "created more institutes, funds, institutions, and foundations than Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Filene together." In his book Propaganda, Bernays argued that scientific manipulation of public opinion is key. "A relatively small number of persons," he wrote, " . . . pull the wires which control the public mind."
Bernays <http://www.bway.net/~drstu/chapter.html> believed that "[s]omebody interested in leading the crowd needs to appeal not to logic but to unconscious motivation." Trust Us, We're Experts shows how the world's richest and most powerful corporations do this.
The authors describe how the tobacco industry first hired movie stars to sell cigarettes and then spent millions of dollars to counter findings that cigarettes cause cancer, a strategy based on the so-called third-party technique and on testimonials.
"'How can the persuader reach these groups that make up the large public?' Bernays asked. . . . 'He can do so through their leaders . . . . The group leader thus becomes a key figure in the molding of public opinion.'" The third-party technique distinguishes PR from advertising. "The best use of a PR firm will be when the firm supplies useful information to influential reporters and analysts who have large audiences." This strategy camouflages the actual source of information, encourages conformity to vested interests while pretending to encourage independence, and replaces facts with emotion-laden symbolism.
I was particularly appalled at the story of scientist Arpad Pusztai. Pusztai identified troubling results in rats fed genetically modified potatoes. When he announced his findings, his bosses at the Rowett Research Institute in Aberdeen, Scotland, suspended him (he soon retired) and discredited his research. Before reading this account, I had believed the official version: Pusztai did shoddy research. But this book indicates that Pusztai's work was fine - its only fault was that it went against major commercial interests.
Another disturbing case involved psychologist Claire Ernhart of Case Western Reserve University. Ernhart, who received grants from the industry-funded International Lead Zinc Research Organization, also serves as a courtroom "expert witness." A physician, Herbert Needleman, published results showing that lead-exposed children are more hyperactive and suffer more attention deficit. In 1981, Ernhart formally accused Needleman of having conducted flawed research. An Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigation found inconsequential statistical errors. The world's largest PR firm, Hill and Knowlton, then sent a draft copy of the EPA report to journalists together with a cover letter claiming that the EPA panel had rejected Needleman's findings.
When the EPA reversed its position and adopted Needleman's findings, Hill and Knowlton continued to circulate the draft report. In 1991, Ernhart wrote to the National Institutes of Health charging Needleman with scientific misconduct. In 1992 Needleman obtained an open hearing to confront his accusers. Ernhart and another psychologist claimed Needleman had manipulated variables to produce biased, anti-lead results. Needleman's scientific defenders showed that even without these variables, his results remained the same: For every 10 parts per million increase of lead in a child's baby tooth, there was a two-point drop in IQ.
The authors recount similar cases in which millions of dollars were paid to PR companies by corporations whose interests ranged from the food and restaurant businesses to the oil and chemical industries. The issues involved industrial diseases and work-related illnesses; safety and risk assessment; and the impact of organochlorines such as DDT, PCBs, and dioxin, chemicals that can disrupt hormone metabolism.
Rampton and Stauber continue with a description of the battle between environmentalists and the biotech food industry. They note that many of the world's largest chemical corporations, such as Monsanto, Novartis, Hoechst, Pharmacia, Dow Chemical, and DuPont, shifted their investments from chemicals to food and pharmaceuticals. The investigative journalists conclude that "government regulators are not presently functioning to safeguard the public's best interest." As an obvious example of abuse, they cite the story of one regulator, a former Monsanto attorney, who helped draft an FDA policy and later left the FDA to return to work for Monsanto.
Trust Us, We're Experts also considers the effect of big money on universities and scientific journals, describing instances in which tobacco companies paid 13 scientists $156,000 to write letters to influential medical journals. Chapter 9 looks at the concept of "junk science," a self-serving term coined by corporate attorneys, lobbyists, PR firms, and industry-funded "think tanks" to discredit scientific and medical studies that might threaten corporate profits.
In chapter 10, the authors discuss another problem closely linked to industry: global warming. They also address recent severe weather events, such as the breaking off of three large icebergs from the Antarctic ice shelf in May of 2000. As an example of a corporate contribution to the debate, the authors tell the story of a PR representative of the American Petroleum Institute who outlined a plan to recruit scientists without "a long history of visibility and/or participation in the climate change debate." They would have $5 million over two years, including $600,000 to develop a cadre of 20 "respected climate scientists" who were to "recruit . . . a team of five independent scientists to participate in media outreach. These scientific spokesmodels would be sent around to meet with science writers . . . thereby raising questions about and undercutting the 'prevailing scientific wisdom.'"
At times, Rampton and Stauber can be naïve or unrealistic. They bemoan the increasing dependence of science on government funding and lament the loss of the "gentleman scientist" of an earlier era. But when wealthy scientists attempt research using their own money today, the science community brands them amateurs and accords them little respect. The authors also question scientific journals' use of page charges: "Bear in mind that authors can pay to have scientific findings published, even in some peer-reviewed journals." But most journals charge per page to cover publication costs, and everybody pays the same amount. Page charges stem from journals' financial needs, not from a cynical willingness to profit from otherwise unpublishable research.
Before reading this book, I was an enthusiastic supporter of biotechnology and genetically modified (GM) foods. Now I'm not so sure. Last summer, I debated GM foods with a fervent opponent. I argued that they could provide vitamin A in rice for developing nations, and produce bananas that could be used as vaccines for children in the third world. I still find these goals desirable, but I'm now more skeptical. I ascribed distrust of GM foods to ignorance or technophobia. After reading this book, I fear that my enthusiastic support resulted partly from ignorance - not of the science, but of the politics.
This book, which is well researched and includes 33 pages of footnotes and references, is an excellent primer for readers not familiar with the manipulation of public opinion. A major strength is its help in directing readers to relevant information, and instruction on how to investigate problems affecting local communities.
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Sibylle Hechtel is a freelance writer whose articles' topics include science and rock climbing. As an undergraduate, she climbed Yosemite's El Capitan with Beverly Johnson in 1973. This was the first all-female ascent of one of the most difficult rock climbs in the world. She continued her graduate studies at the University of California at Irvine, where she wrote for Summit and the American Alpine Journal, and worked as a TV stunt woman and model for a Coca-Cola commercial. After finishing her Ph.D., she did research on mitochondrial DNA at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, and then took a job as a lecturer at Cal Tech. After four years of performing labs in basements without windows, she left academia to join expeditions around the world: first Western climbers in the Ak-Su range (Kyrghistan) in 1987; Everest in 1988; and the Austrian Women's Expedition to Shishapangma, Tibet, in 1994 (the 13th or 14th highest peak in the world).She lives in Colorado, where she spends her days off climbing and teaching skiing in the winter.